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Re-imagining the global: relocation 
and local identities in Cairo
Farha Ghannam
Short of a certain threshold of likelihood, only magical solutions remain. 
Magical hope is the outlook on the future characteristic of those who have 
no real future before them. (Bourdieu 1979: 69)
‘Praise the Prophet. Once upon a time, there was an old woman who 
used to live in an apartment that was as small as that tiny table [pointing 
to the small table in their living room]. Each time the old woman swept 
the floor, she found either one pound or 50 piasters [an Egyptian pound 
is worth around 34 cents] that she kept hidden in a place in her window. 
The old woman was saving to buy a larger apartment. But one day, a 
thief stole all the money that she saved. She was very sad. An afriit 
[demon or ghost] appeared and asked the old woman what she would 
like to have. She asked for a larger apartment. The afriit asked her, 
“Would you like the apartment to have a balcony.'”’ and she answered 
yes. He asked her, “Would you like a television set, a fan and a bottle of 
water?” [describing some of the things that were in front of us in the 
living room]. The old woman said yes. Then he asked her, “And would 
you like some pictures of Samira Said and Latifa?” [two popular female 
Moroccan and Tunisian singers whose posters were decorating the wall 
of the living room]. The woman again answered yes. The afriit brought 
all these things for the old woman. She was very happy and cried out of 
joy. In the same day, however, she smelled the birshaam} that was hidden 
behind the television set which caused her heart to collapse [gham ala 
albaha] and the old woman died’ (a story told to me by the five-year-old 
Amal in Cairo, 1994).
Amal’s narrative was contextualized by her family’s attempts to find a 
larger housing unit to move into from the one-bedroom apartment that 
she, her four sisters and their parents have been occupying since 1980,
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when the family was displaced from their home in the centre of the city 
and relocated in al-Zawiya al-Hamra in northern Cairo. Amal’s images 
of the desired home are constructed, as is the case with many other 
children, from global images transmitted to them through television 
programmes, school textbooks and visits to different parts of the city. 
Her dreams, as well as those of her sisters, of the future apartment are 
informed by the movies and soap operas that they like to watch: a big 
apartment with a balcony, a spacious kitchen, modern furniture and 
organized spatial arrangements inside and outside the unit. These images 
contradict the objective realities of Amal’s life and create desires that 
cannot be satisfied even through some magical means. Like the dreams 
of many other low-income people, Amal’s discourse ‘proceeds in a jagged 
line, the leaps into daydream being followed by relapses into a present 
that withers all fantasies’ (Bourdieu 1979: 69). Death and destruction is 
the ultimate answer.
Amal, her family and the rest of their neighbours are not fax-users, 
e-mail receivers, jumbo jet travellers or satellite-owners. They are part 
of Cairo’s working class whose experience of ‘the global’ is structured 
by their economic resources and position in social space. In addition to 
the many consumer goods, especially television sets, that are desired by 
people and are becoming signs of distinction, Amal’s family and many 
other families experienced the force of the global in their displacement 
from their ‘locality’ in the centre of the city. Their houses were 
demolished to be replaced by buildings and facilities that cater to upper- 
class Egyptians, international tourists and the transnational community. 
In this chapter, I focus on relocation, utilized as part of the state efforts 
to ‘modernize’ Cairo and its people, to show how global discourses and 
forces are articulated in contradictory ways at the national and local 
levels. In the first section, I present a brief review of the history of the 
relocation of roughly 5000 working-class families from 1979 to 1981 and 
the state public discourse utilized to justify the project. This discourse 
strategically appealed to the global in the state’s attempts to implement 
its different economic policies and to construct a modern national 
identity. In the second part, I draw on my recent ethnographic research 
in Cairo, or Umm al-Dunya (the mother of the world) as Egyptians like 
to refer to it, to map some of the identities that are attached to and 
formed by Amal’s group to show how the displacement of the local by 
global processes and national policies brought new changes that paved 
the way to redefine local communal feelings in ways that help people live 
in the modern world. I argue that religious identity, as a hegemonic 
identity in the formation, was consolidated by the changes brought by 
the global as experienced by the people and as filtered in national policies.
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Modernity and the struggle over urban space
With her vast capabilities, the United States is bound in duty, even naturally 
expected, to assist all those striving for a better future alike for themselves 
and for the whole world. (Sadat 1978: 328)
In Search for Identity (1978), Anwar el-Sadat presents a strong critique 
of Nasser’s policies that kept the country isolated from its neighbours 
and the rest of the world and destroyed Egypt’s economy. To remedy 
the country’s chronic economic and financial problems, Sadat reversed 
Nasser’s policies by suspending relationships with the Soviet Union and 
reorienting Egypt towards the West. He turned to the United States in 
particular for aid in resolving Egypt’s conflict with Israel as well as the 
economic and technological development of the country. After his victory 
in the 1973 war (at least it was a victory for him), Sadat crystallized his 
new visions and ideas in declaring ‘the open-door policy’ or infitah in 
1974. This policy aimed to ‘open the universe ... open the door for fresh 
air and remove all the barriers (hawajiz) and walls that we built around 
us to suffocate ourselves by our own hands’ (Sadat 1981: 12). As he 
explained to a group of young Egyptian men, Sadat’s infitah was motiv­
ated by his belief that each one of them would like to ‘get married, own 
a villa, drive a car, possess a television set and a stove, and eat three 
meals a day’ (Sadat 1981: 12).
Sadat’s policy strived to modernize the country through speeding 
planned economic growth, promoting private investment, attracting 
foreign and Arab capital, and enhancing social development (Ikram 1980). 
Private local and international investments were expected to secure the 
capital needed to construct modern Egypt. Egyptians were encouraged 
to work in oil-producing countries and invest their remittances in the 
building of the country. At the same time, laws were enacted to secure 
the protection needed to encourage foreign investors and to facilitate the 
operation of private capital. Investments in tourism were especially im­
portant because they were expected to ‘yield high economic returns and 
provide substantial foreign exchange and well-paid employment’ (Ikram 
1980: 309).
This orientation to the global, the outside, or the ‘universe’ as Sadat 
describes it, required a ‘distinctive bundle of time and space practices 
and concepts’ (Harvey 1990: 204). Many changes were needed to facilitate 
the operation of capital and meet the new demands that were created. 
For example, the growing demand for luxury and middle-class housing 
for the transnational community and Egyptians who work in oil- 
producing countries inflated the price of land, especially in the centre of
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the city, and increased the cost of construction materials (Rageh 1984). 
The promotion of private and foreign investment also increased the 
demand for offices and work-oriented spaces. High-rises proliferated 
around Cairo, using Western design principles and Los Angeles and 
Houston, Sadat’s favourite American cities, became the models that were 
to be duplicated (Ibrahim 1987).
Two tendencies were expressed in the discourses and policies of urban 
planning that aimed to promote the infitah policies and to rebuild modern 
Cairo. The first tried to integrate into the modern city areas of signi­
ficance to Egypt’s glorious past (for example, the pyramids and Islamic 
monuments), which Sadat loved to emphasize and which were visited by 
tourists. The second tendency, which is the subject of this chapter, 
attempted to reconstruct the ‘less desirable’ parts, especially popular 
quarters, that did not represent the ‘modern’ image of Egypt and were 
not fit to be gazed at by upper-class Egyptians and foreign visitors.
The state, the global and the creation of the ‘modern’ city‘s
Faust has been pretending not only to others but to himself that he 
could create a new world with clean hands, he is still not ready to accept 
responsibility for the human suffering and death that clear the way. (Ber­
man 1988: 68)
As part of Sadat’s larger plan to restructure the local landscape and 
build ‘modern’ Cairo, around 5000 Egyptian families were moved during 
the period from 1979 to 1981 from Central Cairo (Bulaq) to housing 
projects built by the state in two different neighbourhoods; ‘Ain Shams 
and al-Zawiya al-Hamra. Bulaq, once the site of the winter houses of 
the rich, then a major commercial port and later an industrial centre 
(Rugh 1979), had become unfit for the modern image that Sadat was 
trying to construct. This area, which over the years had housed thousands 
of Egyptian low-income families, is adjacent to the Ramsis Hilton, next 
to the television station, around the corner from the World Trade Center, 
across the river from Zamalek (an upper-class neighbourhood), overlooks 
the Nile, and is very close to many of the facilities that are oriented to 
foreign tourists. The area then occupied by low-income families became 
very valuable because Sadat’s policies, as he proudly announced, increased 
the price of the land which was needed to facilitate the operation of 
capital. The old crowded houses were to be replaced by modern build­
ings, luxury housing, five-star hotels, offices, multi-storey parking lots, 
movie theatres, conference rooms, and centres of culture (al-Ahram 27 
December 1979: 3). Officials thus emphasized the urgent need to remove
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the residents of this old quarter because many international companies 
were ready to initiate economic and tourist investment in the area. 
Expected profits from these investments would contribute to national 
income and assist the state in securing money to build new houses for 
the displaced groups {al-Ahram, 27 December 1979; 9). The residents’ 
efforts to stop their forced relocation did not materialize and their calls 
upon the government to include them in the reconstruction of their area 
were denied. Voices that protested the relocation were quickly silenced 
and objections raised by the displaced population were considered 
‘selfish’. Officials emphasized that the benefit of the ‘entire nation’ should 
prevail over everything else {al-Ahram, 9 July 1979).
The local was also displaced to protect the state orientation to the 
global. The relocation project took place two years after the famous 1977 
riots that protested the increase in the prices of basic daily goods, 
especially bread. Protesters targeted infitah-Klzttd facilities such as five- 
star hotels and nightclubs, and chanted slogans against Sadat’s policies 
(Abd El-Razaq 1979). The neighbourhood, with its narrow lanes and 
crowded streets, made it impossible for the police to chase those who 
participated in the riots {Mayo, 22 June 1981). The relocated group was 
seen by the state and the state-controlled press as part of ‘a conspiracy 
organized by communists’ that aimed to distort the achievements of the 
infitah and their housing became an obstacle to the promotion of Sadat’s 
policies and to police attempts to crush protest against these policies.
The rhetorical strategies employed by the state were largely based in 
the appeal to the global. This appeal was manifested by the emphasis on 
modernity^ and its objectification in material forms, rational planning, 
the importance of visual aspects and the tourists’ gaze in representing 
Cairo, the separation of the home from the workplace, international 
investment, science, health, hygiene, green areas and clean environment, 
consumer goods and the importance of the productive agent in the 
construction of a modern national identity."^ The global was strategically 
used to offer the people a ‘Faustian bargain’ (cf Berman 1988) which 
forced the relocated group to pay a high price for Egypt’s opportunity to 
be modernized’. Using force (police) and seduction (by appealing to the 
global and offering alternative housing), the project removed them from 
the centre of the city and deprived them of the benefits associated with 
the modern facilities and the new changes that promised prosperity for 
everyone. The group lost a major part of its economic and ‘symbolic 
capital’, to use Bourdieu’s (1984) term, which was their central geo­
graphical location. Relocation destroyed most of the group’s informal 
economy, altered their access to many cheap goods and services, and 
destroyed their social relationships and reordered their personal lives.
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As previously mentioned, the group was divided into two parts, each 
relocated to a different neighbourhood away from the gaze of tourists 
and upper-class Egyptians. One part, the focus of this study, was moved 
to public housing (masaakin) units constructed for them in al-Zawiya al- 
Hamra in northern Cairo. The move into these units, which were labelled 
as ‘modern’, promised to improve the lives of the people and turn them 
into ‘healthy modern productive citizens who will contribute in the 
construction of their mother country’ (al-Ahram, 27 December 1979). 
The state’s project assumed a transparent relationship between space 
and identity and totally ignored the role of social actors in transforming 
and resisting its policies and ideologies. Rather than creating a unified 
modern city, I argue that these policies created a more fragmented urban 
fabric and paved the ground for other competing collective identities. 
Religious identity in particular has successfully presented itself as a 
powerful alternative that can articulate the various antagonistic identities 
that are constructed in the relocation site.
Global discourses and local identities
Since Sadat started his open-door policy, Cairo has witnessed the intro­
duction of new forms of communication,^ more emphasis on international 
tourism, increasing importance of consumer goods, and a growing flow 
of ideas related to civil society, democracy and political participation. 
Theoretical developments in anthropology and cultural studies have 
demonstrated that these global processes are not producing one dominant 
culture but present a set of discourses and practices that are juxtaposed 
in complex ways in local contexts (Hall 1991a; 1993; Massey 1994; Lash 
and Urry 1994). Thus, contrary to the old conceptualization of the world 
as becoming a ‘global village’, local differences and identities are not 
destroyed but are being reinforced in many cases by global forces and 
processes (Hall 1991b; 1993; Ray 1993; Massey 1994).
With the growing connectedness between different parts of the globe 
and with the circulation of global discourses and images facilitated by 
new systems of communication, the Other is becoming more identified 
with the self in complex ways. The connectedness and tension between 
the self and the Other is crucial to understanding how identities are 
constructed and shift over time and how the Other is simultaneously 
desired and dreaded. One example can be found in how people in Cairo 
desire the global (in this case identified as the West) because it is organ­
ized, clean, rich and ‘democratic’ and at the same time they distrust it 
because it is associated with ‘moral corruption’, drugs and violence. The 
focus on the connectedness and tension with the Other is therefore a
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necessary step to theorize the different ways that the global is reshaping 
local identities and redrawing their boundaries. This focus will enable us 
to conceptualize local identifications not as static but as always in the 
process of formation and constructed of multiple discourses and as 
composed ‘in and through ambivalence and desire’ (Hall 1991b: 49).
‘Globalization’, however, should not be reduced to ‘Americanization’ 
as some authors tend to do (Hall 1991a; Hannerz and Lofgren 1994). 
While the ‘American conception of the world’ (Hall 1991a: 28) may be 
hegemonic in various contexts, people experience the influence of other 
globals . People in al-Zawiya al-Hamra not only experience the American 
culture that is transmitted to them in movies starring Arnold Schwarze- 
negger but they also experience the global through oil-producing 
countries where their children and male relatives work as well as through 
the mixture of people who visit and work in Cairo from different Arab 
countries. For example, women use oil for their hair that comes from 
India via their sons who work in Kuwait and collect their wedding 
trousseau from clothes, sheets and blankets brought from Kuwait; others 
visit husbands in Saudi Arabia; and many have accumulated electrical 
appliances from Libya where husbands and sons work. Despite the fact 
that many of the consumer goods are produced in the West, their mean­
ings are given to them by their users who live in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. 
For many, consumer goods are investments that can be exchanged for 
cash when needed. Several families use their refrigerators to cool water 
during the summer but turn them into closets during the winter to store 
household appliances. The global is also introducing new forms of identi­
fication between the subjects of its processes. People, for example, enjoy 
watching television, especially some of the global sports events such as 
the soccer World Cup. Young men and women follow these games very 
closely; they know the names of the Brazilian, German and Italian 
players. Whfle watching these games, different identities compete for 
priority: they shift from supporting African and Arab teams to cheering 
for third world teams when they play against European teams (Brazil 
against Germany, for example). People, thus, do not experience the global 
as a coherent set of discourses and processes that are transmitted from 
the West to the rest of the world but experience fragments and contra­
dictory pieces that are filtered through other centres and that do not 
necessarily present a unified ‘conception of the world’. Therefore, ‘the 
global’, as an analytical concept, should be expanded to include a mixture 
of images, discourses and goods that are brought to people through 
various channels such as state-controlled media, commercial video tapes, 
audio tapes that are distributed by Islamic activists, and consumer goods 
brought to al-Zawiya al-Hamra by migrants to Arab countries.
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It is also important to remember that, as a theoretical concept, ‘the 
local’ should not be confused, as Massey (1994) and Lash and Urry 
(1994) argue, with the concrete, the empirical or the authentic or a 
spatially bounded entity (Urry 1995). I use ‘local’ to mean ‘acts of positing 
within particular contexts’ (Tsing 1993: 31). People attach multiple mean­
ings to their localities that vary from one context to another. Despite the 
fact that geographical space is used as a point of reference for several 
local identities in Cairo, these different contexts share a set of social 
relationships and identities that include those who are like us (local 
people) and exclude people who are not like us (outsiders). Thus, when 
people identify the relocated group as ‘those from Bulaq’, they are trying 
to exclude them from another collective identity that includes people 
who have been living in al-Zawiya and identify primarily with it. The 
relocated people still refer to themselves as ‘people of Bulaq’ despite the 
fact that they have been living in al-Zawiya for fifteen years. Many also 
still identify with their old villages and towns that they left more than 
fifty years ago. In short, there is not one ‘local’ but there are various 
‘locals’ that are juxtaposed in complex ways with multiple ‘globals’.
Old places, new identities
Here in al-Zawiya, you do not find Pizza Hut and Kentucky Fried Chicken. 
Such places can never get any profit in areas like this. People are poor and 
the money they will pay for one meal in one of these restaurants will feed 
the whole family for a week if not more. (A male shop-owner who works in 
al-Zawiya but lives in another middle-class neighbourhood)
To understand the local identities that are in the process of formation in 
al-Zawiya al-Hamra, it is important to remember that state practices and 
discourses were based on what Foucault calls ‘dividing practices’ 
(Rabinow 1984: 8). The project started by separating and stigmatizing 
the targeted population as an expedient rationalization of policies that 
aim to modernize, normalize and reintegrate them within the larger 
community. Not only were the housing conditions attacked by state 
officials, but the people themselves were stigmatized and criticized. A 
‘scientific’ social study conducted to determine the needs of the relocated 
group revealed, as stated by the Minister of Construction and New 
Communities, that the area of Bulaq in general and one of its neigh­
bourhoods (al-Torgman) in particular have been shelters for qiradatia 
(street entertainers who perform with a baboon or monkey), female 
dancers, pedlars and drug dealers (al-Ahram, 27 December 1979: 3). 
The ‘locals’ were also represented as passive, unhealthy and isolated
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people who did not contribute to the construction of the mother-country 
and who had many social ills.* After resettlement, these publicized stereo­
types fostered a general feeling of antagonism towards the newcomers. 
In addition to repeating the same words that were circulated in the 
media, residents of al-Zawiya added other stereotypes to describe this 
group such as labat (trouble-makers) and shalaq (insolent). Women, in 
particular, were singled out (as they were also singled out by the Minister 
who described them as dancers or Ghawazi); they were described as 
rude and vulgar, and were used in daily conversation as an analogy for 
bad manners.
These negative constructions of the relocated group are supported 
and perpetuated by the physical segregation of their housing (masaakin) 
from the rest of the community. Their public housing is clearly defined 
and separated from other projects and private houses (ahali). Public 
housing is characterized by a unified architectural design (the shape, the 
size of the buildings, as well as the colours of walls and windows), 
whereas private housing has more diversified patterns. This unity in 
design and shape sharply defines and differentiates public housing from 
private houses and makes it easier to maintain boundaries that separate 
the relocated from other groups. In short, neither the discourse of the 
state nor the shape and location of the housing project enhance the 
dialogical relationship between the relocated group and other groups in 
al-Zawiya. After fourteen or fifteen years of resettlement, the relocated 
group continues to be stigmatized and its interaction with the rest of the 
neighbourhood is restricted.
The identity of Bulaq With their stigmatization in the state discourse 
and by the residents of al-Zawiya, and with the hostility that faced them, 
the relocated population rediscovered their common history and identi­
fication with the same geographical area. While people used to live in 
Bulaq and identify strongly with their villages of origin, after relocation 
Bulaq became an anchor for the group’s sense of belonging and took 
precedence over other identifications. The attachment to the old place is 
not single or one-dimensional and Bulaq is remembered and related to 
differently by gender and age groups. These differences are beyond the 
scope of this chapter but it is sufficient here to say that Bulaq is of great 
significance for most of the group in reimagining their communal 
feelings. Currently, their public housing is called after one of Bulaq’s 
neighbourhoods {masaakin al-Torgman) and people express their strong 
attachment to their old place in songs and daily conversations. Despite 
the fact that relocation reordered relationships within the group and 
destroyed a major part of their support system, the old neighbourhood
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Still structures parts of the people’s current interaction. They still refer 
to the people who used to live in Bulaq as ^min 'andina' (from our place) 
which not only creates a common ground for identification but also 
indicates certain expectations and mutual obligations between the people 
in the current area of residence. At the same time, Bulaq is the point of 
reference for their identification with those who still live in parts of 
Bulaq’ and those who moved to ‘Ain Shams.
Through relocation, the group lost, among other things, a major part 
of its ‘symbolic capital’. This is mainly manifested in two important 
aspects related to group members’ identification with the old location. 
First, they used to live next to an upper-class neighbourhood, Zamalek. 
Young men and women, as emphasized by the people themselves and 
documented in an famous old movie {A Bride from Bulaq), could even 
claim that they were from Zamalek because only ‘a bridge’ separated (or 
connected) the two neighbourhoods. People also lost the pleasure and 
satisfaction associated with looking at the beautiful buildings and knowing 
that people of Zamalek - and much to their shame, as described by one 
informant — used to see Bulaq with its old and shabby houses.
Second, the group used to live in an ‘authentic popular’ or baladi area 
and perceives its relocation in al-Zawiya as moving down the social ladder. 
In Bulaq, the ‘authentic popular’ quarter, people used to live next to 
each other, separated only by narrow lanes that allowed close interaction 
and strong relationships. They remember the old place in the way people 
used to cooperate and ‘eat together’. Their rootedness in the same place 
over a long period of time provided people with a strong support system, 
open social relationships, and a sense of security and trust. In contrast, 
al-Zawiya is a relatively new neighbourhood. It was mainly agricultural 
fields until the 1960s, when the area started to expand rapidly with the 
state construction of the first public housing project. This project housed 
families from different parts of Cairo who could not afford to live in 
more central locations. Immigrants (mostly Muslims) also came to al- 
Zawiya from different parts of the countryside and many live in private 
housing. The heterogeneity of its population is used by its residents, 
especially members of the relocated group, and people around them to 
indicate that al-Zawiya is not ‘an authentic popular quarter’. Its people 
are ‘selfish’, ‘sneaky’ and ‘untrustworthy’. It is seen as located between 
balad? and raqqi (upper-class areas) which places it, as described by a 
male informant, in a tedious or annoying (baaykh) position. Al-Zawiya, 
thus, is geographically and socially marginal compared to Bulaq.
A key word in understanding the differences between what is seen as 
an ‘authentic’ neighbourhood such as Bulaq and ‘less authentic’ newer 
neighbourhoods such as al-Zawiya is lama. This word refers to the
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growing mixture and gathering of people from different backgrounds 
who live in the same locality. People from various quarters, villages and 
religions are coming to live in the same neighbourhood, hang out at the 
same coffee shop, visit the same market, and ride the same bus. These 
spaces are defined as lamin as compared to a more homogeneous or less 
lama places such as the village and the ‘authentic popular’ quarter based 
on long established relationships. Being rooted in a certain area, that is, 
localized in a particular place, allows the development of strong 
relationships between people. Lama is used to classify different localities 
and points to the difference between a neighbourhood where people know 
each other by name and face as opposed to more heterogeneous areas 
where people are strangers and not to be trusted. Masaakin is lama as 
opposed to ahali housing. Al-Zawiya is lama compared to Bulaq and 
Cairo is lama compared to the villages where the inhabitants originally 
came from.
Relocation and religious identity
Hegemony is not the disappearance or destruction of difference. It is the 
construction of a collective will through difference. It is the articulation of 
differences which do not disappear. (Hall 1991b: 58)
Despite the significance of Bulaq in how people reimagine their com­
munal feelings, this identity does not facilitate the group’s interaction 
with the rest of the people who live in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. Relocation 
rearranged local identities and added to the old identifications: people 
are now identified with a village (the place of origin), as locals of Bulaq 
(where they resided for generations), as occupiers of masaakin (which is 
stigmatized by dwellers in private housing) and as inhabitants of al- 
Zawiya al-Hamra (not known for its good reputation in Cairo). But above 
all, they are mainly Muslims. Religion, rather than nationalism, neigh­
bourhood and the village of origin, became a powerful discourse in 
articulating and socially grounding the various identities of the different 
groups residing in al-Zawiya al-Hamra.^ Only the religious identity 
promises to articulate these identifications without destroying them.‘“ 
Displaced families, ahali and masaakin inhabitants, people of Bulaq and 
al-Zawiya, rural immigrants, Fallahin (peasants who come from villages 
in Lower Egypt) and Sa’idis (immigrants from Upper Egypt), who are 
largely pushed from their villages to Cairo in their search for work and 
a better life, as well as residents who moved from other areas of Cairo 
can all find commonality in religion that is expressed in practices such as 
a dress code and the decoration of houses and shops.
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Islam brings people together on the basis of a common religion. 
Despite the fact that Muslims do not know each other on a personal 
basis, religion creates a ‘safe’ space (the mosque), a common ground 
where they are connected to each other, and a sense of trust and rooted­
ness. This is clearly manifested in how the mosque, of all public spaces, 
is gaining importance in facilitating the interaction of various groups 
and the formation of a collective identity. To start with, the mosque’s 
growing centrality in daily life is manifested in the many modern services 
that are provided to the people in it. Through charitable organizations 
{jam’iyyat khayriyya), the mosque provides socially required services 
such as affordable education, health care and financial support to the 
poor. It is also the place where discourses circulate that prescribe and/ 
or forbid daily practices. Above all, it is the most acceptable and safest 
social space where various groups can meet and interact.
To understand the importance of the mosque, we need to go back to 
the word lama. As previously mentioned, people tend to distrust areas 
and public spaces that are labelled as lama such as the market, the coffee 
shop and the bus. These spaces are seen as ‘dangerous’ and people are 
very careful when visiting or utilizing them. Compared to such spaces, 
the mosque, which is a historical space that is legitimated through its 
naturalized relationship with religion, is currently being actively articu­
lated to frame the interaction between members of different groups as 
well as to empower emerging meanings, identities and relationships. 
Those who are labelled as trouble-makers and rude (people who come 
from Bulaq and live in masaakin) as well as the untrustworthy and selfish 
(people of al-Zawiya as described by people of Bulaq) can all meet in the 
mosque and collectively identify themselves as Muslims.
Thus, the power of the mosque is being currently reinforced through 
its promise of an equal and unified community out of a heterogeneous 
urban population. It is accessible to all Muslims and brings them in on 
equal terms. The unity of prayers and the importance of communal 
feelings is manifested in the unifying discourse and the similar move­
ments that are performed simultaneously. The Imam leads the prayer 
and coordinates the movement of all the attendees through his pro­
nounced signals that indicate when one should bend forward on the 
knees or stand up straight, and so on. Emphasis is placed upon standing 
in straight lines, very close to other attendees, in a way that leaves no 
empty spaces through which the devil could enter among the devout and 
divide their collectivity."
The feelings that are associated with being part of a collectivity were 
cited by many, especially by women, as one of the main reasons for 
going to the mosque. As is the case with most of her neighbours, reloca-
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tion shattered most of the support system that connected the fifty-five- 
year-old Umm Ahmed with friends and neighbours who were relocated 
to ‘Ain Shams or to different parts of the new housing project in al- 
Zawiya al-Hamra. Although she used to perform her religious duties on 
a regular basis in Bulaq, Umm Ahmed’s religiosity gained a different 
meaning in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. In addition to her adoption of the khimar 
(a head garment that covers the hair and the shoulders), which is seen as 
the ‘real Islamic dress’, Umm Ahmed began attending local mosques on 
a daily basis. She explained that she goes to mosques because the presence 
of other people strengthens her will and provides her with more energy 
than when praying alone. Currently, Umm Ahmed frequents five local 
mosques to perform four out of the five daily prayers. For Friday prayer, 
she usually selects a large mosque, located within the boundaries of the 
masaakin but that is also attended by some worshippers from the ahali. 
She also visits two small mosques that are identified with an Islamic 
group active in al-Zawiya al-Hamra. She attends these two mosques, 
which are located in the ahalt area, to listen to weekly lessons and 
participate in Quran recital sessions. Another mosque, which is located 
next to the vegetable market in the ahali area, is a convenient site for the 
midday prayer when Umm Ahmed is shopping for the family’s daily 
food. For the evening prayer, she chooses a smaller mosque on the edge 
of the housing project that is attended by a mixture of worshippers from 
ahali and masaakin areas. She prefers this mosque, as she explains, 
because she meets ‘wise’ women who like to talk to her. Over the last 
five years, Umm Ahmed has formed strong relationships with other 
women from different parts of the neighbourhood, especially from the 
ahali area, who attend the same mosque. If one of them does not come 
to the evening prayer, she goes with other women to ask about their 
absent friend. At the same time, the mosque not only brings people 
together from the same neighbourhood but also encourages people to 
move from one part of the city to the other. Young men and women, for 
example, use the city bus to tour the city in their search for the ‘truth’. 
They cross the boundaries of their localities to go to other neighbour­
hoods to attend certain mosques where popular sheikhs preach.
The mosque is also becoming more open to women in al-Zawiya al- 
Hamra. This is perceived by some Islamic activists as essential to counter 
other spaces that are open to women, such as universities, the workplace, 
cinemas and nightclubs. Women are identified by men as more vulnerable 
to the influence of global (defined here as American) discourses and 
practices. Women’s actions, dress and access to public life are seen as 
threatening the harmony of the Islamic community and as the source of 
many social ills. Women have internalized these ideas and hold them-
132 REDISCOVERING ISLAM
selves, and not men, responsible for the safety of the morals of the 
community. As women repeatedly emphasize, men are weak creatures 
and cannot resist the seduction imposed on them by women who do not 
adopt Islamic dress. At the same time, women can be very active in the 
construction of the Islamic community. More voices have emphasized 
the positive aspects associated with opening the mosque to women who, 
as mothers, sisters and wives, can be active agents capable of altering 
their own practices as well as shaping the actions and values of other 
family members. Thus, to contain the destructive potential of women 
and promote their constructive power in the formation of the Islamic 
community, more attempts are made by Islamic activists to incorporate 
women within the mosque. Currently, women, especially those without 
jobs and small children, go to the mosque on a regular basis for prayer 
and to attend weekly lessons, while working women usually attend the 
Friday prayer. Women are also becoming more active in the mosque 
through their roles as teachers, students, workers and seekers of social, 
educational and medical services. In addition, more women help in taking 
care of the mosque and participate in mosque-related activities such as 
preparing food and distributing it to the needy.
Globalization and religious identities
It is important not to confuse my previous discussion of religious identity 
with ‘fundamentalism’, ‘extremism’ or ‘militant Islam’, which have been 
the centre of attention of several studies (Ibrahim 1982; Kepel 1993). 
Fundamentalism especially has been the focus of studies that aim to 
examine the relationship between globalization and religion (see, for 
example. Turner 1994; Beyer 1994). Such studies limit discussion of the 
ideology of the leaders of some radical Islamic groups and tend to present 
these movements as ‘responses’ or ‘reactions’ to the global. The role of 
ordinary people as active agents in negotiating religious and global dis­
courses in their daily life and the formation of their local identities is 
largely neglected.
Despite the fact that communal feelings based on religion can be 
politicized and used as the basis to mobilize the working class (as 
happened in 1981 in clashes between Muslims and Christians in al- 
Zawiya al-Hamra), at the daily level religious identity brings people 
together as connected selves rather than separated and isolated others. It 
articulates the presence of the group at the neighbourhood level, in­
tegrates its members into the mosque and secures a space for them in 
Cairo. People do not want to relive the past, as some fundamentalists 
seem to desire, but try to live in the present with its complexity and
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contradictions. They hence struggle against efforts of some extremist 
groups who try to impose restrictions on how they appropriate certain 
aspects of modernity. Nuha, for example, is a twenty-three-year-old 
woman with a high school diploma who works in a factory outside the 
neighbourhood. She hears things on the radio, in the mosque and from 
her friends and then lets her heart and mind judge what she will follow. 
She expresses her religiosity in adopting the khimar. At the same time, 
she opposes many of the restrictions that extremists try to impose on 
people, such as forbidding men from wearing trousers and prohibiting 
eating with a spoon because, as some argue, the Prophet did not do these 
things. She believes that had these things existed when the Prophet was 
alive, he would have used them. So it is not a sin {haram) to eat with a 
spoon but, if one chooses to eat with the hands, one will get an extra 
reward.
There are moments when people directly reject the ‘American con­
ception of the world’ (Hall 1991a: 28) with its homogenizing tendencies 
and use this conception to explain the conflict between the state and 
some Islamic groups. A young woman explained the conflict between the 
government and religious groups as follows:
The problem is that the government has strong relationships with the 
United States which hates Islam and Muslims and is trying to spread its 
ideas and practices all over the world, especially wearing short clothes, the 
domination of science, and the destruction of religion. My cousin, who is 
a Sunni,explained to me that Americans have many methods to achieve 
their purposes, especially through schools. They try to prove that science 
is better than religion by using the comparative method. They bring, for 
example, a candle and a light bulb and ask which is better. The first 
represents religion and the second represents science. Of course, one will 
choose the second. They also compare two pictures, one of a man wearing 
a gallabiyya [a long loose gown that the Prophet used to wear] with a beard 
and a rotten look, while the second picture is of a handsome man who is 
shaved and looks very clean and tidy. Of course, anyone will choose the 
second. The whole idea is for science to replace religion and dominate the 
universe. Islam is compatible with science because one can find all answers 
in it if examined closely. Science should serve religion.
The opposition to the ‘global West’, however, is not sufficient to 
explain the growing importance of the mosque and religious identity in 
al-Zawiya al-Hamra. There are complex local and national forces 
juxtaposed with the global to produce religious identity. State oppression, 
the daily frustrations in dealing with state bureaucracy, alienation, the 
fragmentation of the urban fabric, and the ability of Islamic groups to 
utilize various discursive strategies that mobilize people are as important
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as the economic frustration, the unfulfilled expectations and desires, and 
the need to have a voice in the global in understanding why religious 
identity is becoming more hegemonic.''*
As manifested in the services that are being attached to the mosque in 
al-Zawiya al-Hamra, certain global discourses and consumer goods are 
negotiated and appropriated. For example, to avoid state censorship of 
discourses circulated in the mosque, Islamic activists use cassette tapes 
to distribute the religious discourse to a large segment of the urban 
population. Especially for illiterate men and women, tapes provide a 
powerful means of communication that brings popular preachers (that is, 
those who are believed to tell the ‘truth’) from the mosque into the 
home, the workplace, the taxi and the street. These can be replayed until 
their meanings become clear to the listener. Women can also pass them 
on to friends and relatives. On several occasions, women gathered to 
listen to such tapes and expressed strong emotional reactions to the 
descriptions of death, the horrible torture of the grave and the soothing 
visions of heaven.
Various Islamic groups, however, relate differently to the global in 
general and the West in particular. While there were some Islamic 
activists who attack the influence of the West on the dress code and 
practices of Muslims, a major part of the lessons that I attended in the 
mosque as well as tapes I heard in al-Zawiya al-Hamra did not attack the 
West but emphasized the horrible nature of torture that unbelievers 
would go through in the grave and in hell, and, in contrast, the rewards 
that are awaiting the believers in heaven. Women who do not adopt 
Islamic dress are singled out and detailed descriptions are presented of 
how they will be hung from their hair and breasts while huge snakes bite 
their bodies as they are grilled in hell. Women shivered, cried and prayed 
hard asking God to protect them from the horrible torture that is awaiting 
unbelievers. These graphic descriptions contextualize the critique of 
people’s ‘un-Islamic’ practices and the ‘medicine’, as one sheikh said, 
that is provided to heal the ills of the current situation and to win the 
eternal heaven. The prescribed medicine is to go back to God, ask for 
his forgiveness, and live according to his commands.
Although the emphasis on the dress code can be seen as a rejection of 
the influence of the West, I would argue that gender distinctions are the 
centre of the restrictions applied to women’s dress code. Another interest­
ing example could be found in how people negotiate their definition of 
Islam and modernity. Their rejection of many of the ideas that are 
circulated by some religious extremists is clearly manifested by the 
struggle over some consumer goods such as colour televisions, VCRs and 
tape-recorders which are rapidly becoming signs of distinction. Many
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families participate in saving associations {gam'iyyat) to secure money to 
buy these goods which are also seen as investments that can be easily 
exchanged for needed cash. Just as Amal, most people dream of consumer 
goods and better living conditions that television brings to their homes 
without objective means to satisfy them. Many families try to solve 
Ramadan puzzles (these are usually presented daily by popular Egyptian 
performers) and collect the covers of tea-bags and chocolate bars to mail 
to the manufacturer in the hope that they may win a ‘dish’, a familiar 
English word that is used to refer to the satellite dishes that are spreading 
in upper-class neighbourhoods, a VCR, a washing machine or a gas stove. 
Among all the consumer goods that people use, Islamic groups centre 
their struggle against the television set. This struggle can be interpreted 
as ‘rejection of modernity’, but such an analysis fails to see how other 
aspects of modernity are being selectively incorporated in the struggle 
of these groups. They use the fax machine, the tape-recorder, the 
computer and many other modern facilities to achieve their aims. To 
understand the struggle over the television set, one should look how this 
medium is being used in people’s daily lives.
Television is one of the most popular goods that people incorporate 
as one of the basic elements of their daily lives. Except for very few 
people with extreme religious beliefs, there is no housing unit in al- 
Zawiya al-Hamra without a television set. Each family, regardless of its 
income, owns a television set that is the centre of attention of all the 
family members. The television set is a powerful medium that conveys 
to them many experiences and values that can be described as global and 
brings the Other closer than ever to the self The television set and the 
mosque are competing with each other to connect Muslims in different 
parts of the world. People of al-Zawiya al-Hamra are connected with 
other Muslims whom they have never met and who are not assumed to 
be identical duplicates of the self but are identified as the Other that is 
closely connected with the self It is the force that binds people of this 
neighbourhood with Muslims who fight in Bosnia, Afghanistan and 
Chechnya. Young men, who are frustrated with the state’s restriction on 
their participation in fighting with the Bosnian Muslims, circulate stories 
about God’s help and support of the Bosnians. People talk about invisible 
soldiers (angels) and unidentified white planes that bomb the Serbs. 
Islam, thus, is becoming a force in localizing the global and globalizing 
the local. The distinction between Muslims who live in al-Zawiya al- 
Hamra and those who live in the rest of the world (such as the Bosnians) 
is blurred. On the other hand, television is blamed by Islamic groups for 
corrupting the people, silencing them, and distracting their attention 
from God as well as from what happens in their country and the rest of
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the world. With the total state control of this powerful medium, various 
Islamic groups do not have any option but to denounce its role in society 
and try to forbid it.
People are capable of articulating different discourses within their 
religious identity without seeing contradictions in being oriented to the 
global and attempting to enjoy what it offers, and being rooted in their 
religious and local identities. A twenty-year-old factory worker, who was 
born in Bulaq and was relocated with his family in 1980, dreams of 
having enough money to buy a villa in Switzerland for skiing during the 
winter, another villa in India where he will hire singers and dancers to 
perform for him as he has seen on video tapes, and of a palace in Saudi 
Arabia to facilitate his performing of pilgrimage every year. As Hall 
(1991a; 1993) emphasizes, with identity there are no guarantees. The 
openness and fluidity of identities and the multiple discourses that are 
competing to shape them make it hard to guarantee whether an identity 
is going to be inclusive or exclusive.’®
Conclusion
Paradoxically in our world, marginality has become a powerful space. It is a
space of weak power but it is a space of power, nonetheless. (Hall 1991a: 34)
I have tried to show in this chapter how the articulation of global 
discourses and processes is producing contradictory identities at the 
national and local levels. By destroying old neighbourhood relationships, 
stigmatizing and physically segregating the relocated population, the 
project that aimed to construct modern subjects has paradoxically pro­
duced antagonistic local identities that empowered the basis of a collective 
identity which is based on religion. I have also aimed to show the 
important role of active social agents in mediating the different global 
practices and selectively articulating certain global discourses in the 
formation of their local identities. Social agents face the global in col­
lectivities rather than as individuals and the struggle between the local 
and the global is not simply taking place in ‘human minds’ (Goonatilake 
1995: 232). In general, although ‘new regimes of accumulation’ (Hall 
1991a: 30) are appealing to the individual, alienation, racism and up- 
rootedness are being faced collectively. In fact, being part of a collectivity 
is necessary to feel at home in the modern world with its rapid global 
changes. Thus, the local is not passive and local cultural identities are 
not waiting to be wiped out by globalization as some authors suggest 
(see, for example, Goonatilake 1995).
Amal’s dreams should continue to remind us that people experience
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the global in structured ways. It should also draw our attention to the 
fact that many of the writings on globalization are conducted by people 
who feel at home in the global and tend to celebrate the growing ef­
ficiency of transportation, electronic communication and the growing 
connectedness of the globe (see, for example, Friedland and Boden 1994). 
The freedom of travel, however, while experienced by the privileged, is 
denied for millions of people who find borders of the global (especially, 
the USA and Europe) closed to them. The relationship between the 
local and the global cannot be brushed aside by assuming that they are 
‘articulated as one’ (Friedland and Boden 1994: 43). Such statements 
reduce the complexity of the interaction between the global and the local 
and ignore the asymmetrical relationship that is still central to this 
interaction. The analysis presented in this chapter points to the need for 
more attention and sensitivity to the structured nature of globalization 
processes. When people experience the global as a violent attack on their 
cultural identities and self-images, it is not strange that they do not 
embrace global discourses and its representatives (such as international 
tourists). In short, more attention should be devoted to those who live 
on the margin of the marginal: those who are displaced in their own 
‘culture’ and the millions who cannot find solutions to the growing 
number of desires that are brought by the global except through magical 
means, death and destruction or religion that at least promises them a 
better life and the glories of eternal existence in Paradise.
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Buckley, Seteney Shami and the editors of this book for their comments on a draft of 
this chapter.
1. The birshaam is a type of drug that is believed to be produced and circulated 
by the USA and Israel; it is a pill that is taken orally and not sniffed as Amal implies.
2. This phrase should not be taken to mean that the globalization and modern­
ization of Cairo started with Sadat’s policies (for a detailed description of Cairo’s 
history, see Abu-Lughod 1971). Modernity, however, became a national project for 
Sadat and his policies were based on a strong orientation to the rest of the ‘universe’. 
The experiences of many Western countries from the United States and Canada to 
France and West Germany continue to inform the construction of Cairo.
3. Words such as hadith (modern or new), ‘asri (contemporary or modern) and 
madani (civilized or refined) were widely used in the state public discourse.
4. Fifteen years after relocation, no hotels or luxury buildings have been con­
structed in this area. Many argue that the plan to rebuild the city centre died with
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Sadat who was killed a few months after the relocation of the residents of a small part 
of Bulaq. The piece of land that was evacuated is currently used as a parking lot.
5- For example, one can now watch CNN in Cairo if supplied with cable services, 
and satellite dishes are added to the roofs of upper-class residential units.
6. See Mitchell (1988) for an analysis of such constructions under the British 
colonization of Egypt.
7. As previously mentioned, with the death of Sadat, the removal of the rest of 
Bulaq stopped.
8. Baladi is a complex concept that signifies a sense of authenticity and originality. 
It has been discussed in several studies. See, for example. Early (1993) and Messiri 
(1978).
9. Although people strongly identify themselves as Egyptians, the state definition 
of ‘modern’ Egyptians is exclusive. Different groups are not seen as contributing 
positively to the construction of their country and the state believes that its task is to 
cure them of their social ills and pathologies in order to turn them into ‘good Egyptian 
citizens’ (Ghannam 1993).
10. Let us not forget that Sadat tried to present himself as al-Ra’is al-Mu’min or 
‘The Believing President’.
11. In the women’s section, which I had access to, the Friday prayer was coordinated 
by a woman who made sure that we were standing correctly and made room to squeeze 
in newcomers.
12. Despite the incorporation of women, the mosque is still a highly gendered 
space. It manifest and shapes the ways in which gender is constructed. Inside the 
mosque, women are spatially separated from men, their access to the mosque is 
conditioned by the absence of their menstrual period, and within its confines they are 
required to wear long and loose dress and to cover the hair and chest.
13. Al-Sunniyyin (singular Sunni) is used in daily life to refer to Islamic activists 
who are considered strict followers of the Prophet’s traditions or Sunna.
14. It is important to remember that, although these processes take place at the 
neighbourhood level, they are part of the transformations that Cairo and Egypt in 
general have been experiencing in the last two decades.
15. The relationship between Muslims and Christians, for example, in al-Zawiya 
al-Hamra is very complicated and beyond the scope of this chapter. Religion also 
plays a central role among Christians who live in al-Zawiya. The church serves a 
similar role to that of the mosque in bringing Christians together. There is also a 
strong tension between the two religious groups that resulted in clashes between them 
in 1981.
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